## https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=B19259CC-EC9C-5160-ACB8-0B1C493D78DA
# CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock) – Honor BVL-AN16 Exploit Research
> Research on CVE-2026-43499 (GhostLock, rt_mutex stack-UAF) for Honor Magic6 Pro (BVL-AN16). ## Device
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Model | Honor BVL-AN16 (Magic6 Pro) |
| Chip | Qualcomm SM8650 (Snapdragon 8 Gen 3 / pineapple) |
| Kernel | 6.1.128-android14-11-gec1055c9cbb5 |
| System | Android 16 (SDK 36), MagicOS 10, security patch 2026-01-01 |
| Status | Bootloader not unlocked, SELinux enforcing, no su |
## Research Findings
This repository records the detailed attempts and conclusions regarding CVE-2026-43499 on Honor BVL-AN16:
1. **GhostLock’s official exploitation chain** relies on `PR_SET_MM_MAP` stack reclamation. However, Honor preempts the `prctl_set_mm`’s `capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE)` check, rendering this approach ineffective. 2. **Alternative stack reclamation methods** (pselect, TCP, kgsl, setsockopt, process_vm) were analyzed using reverse engineering. None of these methods could align the waiter (depth 0x1a8) on Honor’s stack frame layout (`CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET=y`). 3. **Heap spraying approaches** (skb head reused from order3 slab) are restricted by SLUB runtime state, and none of the six software-based hypotheses were confirmed. 4. **Honor’s proprietary modules** (36 vendor_dlkm modules) were analyzed using reverse engineering; no 32-bit overflows or memory vulnerabilities were found (Android 16 fully supports FORTIFY + KCFI). ## Directory Structure
```
. ├── README.md This file
├── LICENSE Apache 2.0 (source code repository for exploits)
├── docs/ Analysis documents and progress archives
├── scripts/ Reverse engineering/scripts (123 files, capstone format for kernel.bin analysis)
├── disasm/ Reverse engineering results for critical functions
├── scan/ Module scan results (attack surfaces, 32-bit overflows)
├── exploit/ Source code for CVE-2026-43499 exploits (including adaptation for honor-BVL-AN16)
│ ├── exploit/
│ └── poc/
├── keytest.c Test for add_key functionality
└── xattrtest.c Test for setxattr functionality
```
## Key Findings
- `honor_power_genl.ko` (generic netlink power message bus) has no 32-bit overflows, but there is an access control issue with `snd_portid == nl_target`. The stack reclamation delta is calculated as `+0x30`, but `kgsl_ioctl_copy_in` limits the size to 72B, preventing the lock field of the fake waiter from being overwritten. `add_key` (keyctl spraying) is blocked by SELinux `avc denied {write} tclass=key`. `setxattr` has a maximum size of 4096 bytes (ext4/f2fs xattr limitations), making order3 spraying impossible. Next direction: Confirming impact of CVE-2026-64560 (posix-cpu-timers UAF) for version 6.1.128 (≤6.1.179); a full exploit is available for adaptation. ## Attribution
- The exploit source code comes from [NebuSec/CyberMeowfia](https://github.com/NebuSec/CyberMeowfia) (Apache 2.0). GhostLock vulnerability analysis can be found in [Nebula Security — IonStack Part II](https://nebusec.ai/research/ionstack-part-2). ## Disclaimer
This repository is intended solely for security research and learning purposes. Do not use it on unauthorized devices. Running exploits may cause device corruption, data loss, or system instability.