## https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=PACKETSTORM:153262
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### Device Details
Discovered By: Andrew Klaus (andrew@aklaus.ca)
Vendor: Actiontec (Telus Branded)
Model: WEB6000Q
Affected Firmware: 1.1.02.22
Reported: July 2018
CVE: CVE-2018-15555 (Main OS)
CVE: CVE-2018-15556 (Quantenna OS)
### Summary of Findings
Both “main” and “quantenna” have a UART header on the motherboard and
each of them provide full shell + bootloader access.
While the main OS has the credentials user: root pass: admin, the
quantenna environment can be accessed with user: root with an empty
password.
I used a Raspberry Pi to interface with the UART header, but there are
USB UART adapters to do the same thing.
Once root access is obtained, TR-069 Updating can be fully disabled,
preventing the vendor from pushing updates to the device.
### Proof of Concept
Hooking up a Raspberry Pi's UART GPIO header to either UART header on
the modem will give a login prompt. root/admin or root/(nopass)
depending on which modem header connected to.
### Enabling SSH daemon on Main OS
After retrieving a root shell on the main OS over UART, SSH can be
enabled by running the following:
# cli -s Device.X_ACTIONTEC_COM_RemoteLogin.Enable int 1
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -j ACCEPT
dropbear -p 22 -I 1800 &
$ ssh 192.168.1.2 -l admin -oKexAlgorithms=+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
admin@192.168.1.2's password:
BusyBox v1.17.2 (2016-02-03 21:34:18 PST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#
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### Device Details
Discovered By: Andrew Klaus (andrew@aklaus.ca)
Vendor: Actiontec (Telus Branded)
Model: WEB6000Q
Affected Firmware: 1.1.02.22
Reported: July 2018
CVE: CVE-2018-15557
### Summary of Findings
Two instances of Linux run on the WEB6000Q. One is the “main” instance
that runs the web management server, TR-069 daemon, etc., while the
other is the "quantenna" management OS used to manage the wireless.
By hardcoding an IP address in the 169.254.1.0/24 network, and being on
the same layer 2 network, root telnet access can be obtained on the
"quantenna" management environment by accessing:
Host: 169.254.1.2
Port: 23
Login: root (no password prompted)
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