# Security Advisory  
ARA-2020-005: Insecure Direct Object Reference (CVE-2020-15958)  
## Affected Product(s) and Environment(s)  
Product: 1CRM <=8.6.7, confirmed for CRBM System ENT-8.6.5, CRBM System  
ENT-8.6.6 and Startup+ Edition 8.5.15  
Environments: All host environments  
## Security Risk  
Severity: High  
CVSS v3: 8.6  
## Impact  
Confidentiality: High  
Integrity: None  
Availability: None  
## Exploitability  
Access Vector: Network  
Access Complexity: Low  
Privileges Required: None  
User Interaction: None  
## Scope  
Scope: Changed  
## Weakness Classification  
[CWE-862]( Missing  
[CWE-219]( Storage of  
File with Sensitive Data Under Web Root  
## Remediation Level  
Sensitive files must not be stored within the web root or below. These  
files should be stored in a folder outside the web root and secured  
accordingly. A proper access control must be established to deliver  
these files to authorized users only.  
## Timeline  
*2020-07-27: Preliminary CVE Assignment by MITRE  
*2020-07-27: Vendor notification  
*2020-07-28: Notification of vendor's master partner for Germany  
Visual4, as requested by vendor  
*2020-07-31: Visual4 acknowledges vulnerability  
*2020-08-14: Visual4 issues security alert for all 1CRM on-premise  
systems and requests immediate update to version 8.6.7 [1]  
*2020-08-20: Visual4 informs customers by mail about security alert  
*2020-08-27: Vendor reports fix of vulnerability to aramido; fix could  
not yet be verified, public documentation not sufficient  
*2020-09-14: Public disclosure after 45 days of initial vendor notification  
## Description Summary  
1CRM stores uploaded and other files within its web root. Due to  
incomplete authorization checks, an unauthenticated user can remotely  
access these files. Although filenames must be known, 1CRM follows a  
well-known naming pattern for at least some sensitive files.  
## Product Introduction  
"The all-in-one CRM solution for managing every aspect of your business  
online. Collaborate effectively with your team, from near and far.  
1CRM provides everything you need to manage your business online. Start  
with a complete CRM solution including lead forms and eCommerce  
integration. Add a portal to connect with your customers and provide  
self-service options including appointment scheduling. Top things off  
with a sophisticated marketing automation platform to help turn your  
leads into customers!"  
*Source:*[1CRM Website](  
## Technical Description  
1CRM allows to upload files on several occasions, e.g. to record  
*Expenses*and *Purchase Orders*, add personal information to  
*Accounts*and *Contacts*, and to manage *Human Resources*by adding CVs  
and so on. Additionally, backups can be created manually or via a cron  
job alike automatism. Backups can be configured to include the database,  
application configs, file attachments and modules.  
All those files are stored in folders within the root directory of the  
web server (web root). A download script *download.php*exists, which is  
to ensure authorized access to the files. If a user is not authenticated  
or has not enough permissions, the error "Authentication required" is  
However, it is also possible to access the files stored in the web root  
via an insecure direct object reference. As a matter of fact, the  
application makes use of this way of access to download  
*Expense*attachments and backups (and not via the regular download.php  
script). The request on such a file is not handled by the 1CRM  
application but answered by the web server itself. As the folders are  
not protected in any special way, the files are accessible to anyone.  
It is necessary for such a request to know the URI. 1CRM implements a  
predictable folder structure such as  
[/files/upload/42/](/files/upload/42/) and some of the most sensitive  
files have a predictable, at least guessable name such as  
### Proof of Concept (PoC)  
A backup file, which might contain all the CRM's information including  
clear text passwords of linked mailboxes, is stored in  
[/files/backups/](/files/backups/). The file contains the date and the  
time the archive was created. Assuming the backup is created on a daily  
bases, guessing the date is trivial. Guessing the time could be achieved  
by trying out all 86.400 possibilities. However, creating backups  
usually during nightly hours narrows this number further down.  
The backup is an unencrypted file and can for example be access via  
Other uploaded files are stored under  
[/files/upload/\<id>/](/files/upload/<id>/). While it is not a big  
challenge to guess the \<id>-part, it is harder to determine the actual  
filenames. These filenames are generated by the user and not at random.  
Assuming a sales man names an offer according to a certain scheme, e.g.  
Offer_20380119-1.pdf, it might be tempting to try similar names. If this  
vulnerability is combined with another weakness, such as a directory  
listing, an adversary would be able to easily obtain all exposed files.  
## Solution  
We strongly recommend to store sensitive data outside the web root. By  
this, an adversary cannot directly access those file but a download  
mechanism must be implemented. This download script, which already  
exists, must ensure the authorization of the requester.  
As an urgent solution we recommend 1CRM hosters to place an .htaccess  
file within the affected folders. The .htaccess file must contain the  
following for an Apache setup:  
Order deny,allow  
Deny from all  
Furthermore, we suggest to use random file names when storing them into  
a file system. The real file name can be stored into the database if  
necessary. A random file name can be chosen in a way to be hardly  
guessable and to only use secure characters for any operating or file  
Due to the big impact in case a backup file was leaked, we suggest to  
always encrypt backup files.  
Upon fix of all findings by the vendor, we suggest on premise hosters  
the update to the most recent version (at least 8.6.7). Additional  
security measurements such as segmentation and the usage of a virutal  
private network (VPN) are strongly advised.  
## References  
[0][aramido responsible disclosure  
[1][Die Sicherheit Ihres CRM-Systems auf maximale Stufe  
[2][Sicherheitswarnung: 1CRM schützt Daten unzureichend  
## Authors  
Christoph Biedl, aramido GmbH  
E-mail: christoph.biedl ()  
PGP-Fingerprint: 04DF BDFD 81D4 4537 FF20 A8A5 C73C F15B 3780 F158  
Andreas Sperber, aramido GmbH  
E-mail: andreas.sperber ()  
PGP-Fingerprint: FC84 BB4D 696D F04C E1A1 2BED 7518 A24A 06B9 BEA7  
### aramido - Information Security Consultancy  
aramido is a trusted consultancy for information security from  
Karlsruhe. aramido advises companies and other organizations on  
information security issues, checks systems, for example, through  
penetration tests, and helps with security incidents through a rapid  
incident response.  
aramido GmbH  
Amalienstraße 24  
76133 Karlsruhe, Germany  
Management board: Armin Harbrecht, Andreas Sperber  
Web: [](  
## Disclaimer  
The information provided in this advisory is provided "as is" without  
any warranty. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order  
to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of  
this security advisory is available on the aramido web site. aramido  
GmbH disclaims all warranties, either expressed or implied, including  
the warranties of merchantability and capability for a particular  
purpose. aramido GmbH or its suppliers are not liable in any case of  
damage, including direct, indirect, incidental, consequential loss of  
business profits or special damages, even if aramido GmbH or its  
suppliers have been advised of the possibility of such damages. Some  
states do not allow the exclusion or limitation of liability for  
consequential or incidental damages so the foregoing limitation may not  
apply. We do not approve or encourage anybody to break any vendor  
licenses, policies, deface websites, hack into databases or trade with  
fraud/stolen material.  
## Copyright